Low-wage labor markets are traditionally viewed as competitive, and the possibility of strategic behavior by employers is dismissed. However, such behavior is not impossible. This paper investigates the possibility of tacit collusion by low-wage employers while setting wages. A game-theoretic explanation along the lines of the Folk theorem is offered, suggesting that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, proposing a symmetric solution to an infinitely played game of wage-setting. Several empirical techniques were employed in testing the hypothesis, including hurdle models of collusion. CPS monthly data is used for the years 1990-2005, a period that covers the last four federal minimum wage increases (in the US). The likelihood of collusion at minimum wage is evaluated, as well as its dynamics during this period. The results generally support the collusion hypothesis and suggest that employers respond strategically to changes in minimum wage legislation while using the statutory minimum wage as a coordination tool in tacit collusion.
Introduction
Since minimum wage laws were first introduced in the early 20th century, the minimum wage has been a hotly debated issue. Today its relevance has not diminished. Many empirical phenomena attributed to minimum wage still remain unexplained, triggering the development of new research, contributing to the already vast body of minimum wage literature.
When analyzing the impact of the minimum wage, labor economists investigate its efficacy in raising earnings of low-wage workers, its effects on employment, and its overall distortional and welfare effects. When addressing these issues, researchers generally refer to the minimum wage as a price floor, the effects of which greatly depend on the competitive structure of underlying markets, as well as on whether the minimum wage is binding (relative to the competitive market wage). However, this traditional interpretation of the role of the minimum wage is not always successful in explaining a number of empirical phenomena. For instance, why do hikes in the minimum wage not necessarily reduce employment? Why do wages in low wage sectors grow more slowly when compared to the rest of economy? Why are low-wage employers unwilling to raise wages even when unable to hire? Or why is the rate of job creation in low-wage sector generally greater than the economy's average?
While keeping in mind these questions, this paper suggests looking at the role of the minimum wage from a new perspective. The paper proposes that a non-binding minimum wage functions as a focal point for tacit collusion by wage-setting low-wage employers. A simple theoretical analysis of firms' wage choices in a dynamic setting shows that any wage ranging from monopsony to competitive wage may lead to a stable (but socially inefficient) equilibrium if chosen symmetrically by employers. A minimum wage, if it falls within this range of wages, may suggest such a symmetric solution, thus facilitating collusion.
If tacit collusion at minimum wage takes place, the empirical phenomena listed above can be explained. Moreover, if collusion is a reality, it may lead to numerous negative socioeconomic consequences. First, collusion may mean lower wages for low-skilled workers and, as a result, slower wage growth in the long run. Artificially low wages, as the neoclassical theory predicts, would lead to shortages of low-skilled labor, since creation of vacancies by firms employing this type of workers would outpace the growth in the labor supply. Another important consequence of collusion is that it may contribute to the increase in wage (and income) inequality between high-and low-paid workers, since wages of the latter are tied to the existing minimum.
The idea that the minimum wage can be used by employers as a tool for tacit collusion is not entirely new to the labor literature. When the introduction of the Fair Labor Standards Act was debated, John. L. Lewis, representing the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the United Mine Workers of America, expressed concerns that the minimum "fair" wage and the maximum hours that would be periodically set by the proposed FLS Board would tend to become the maximum wage and the maximum hours (Forsythe, 1939) 1 .
The fact that a salient focal point aids in tacit collusion is acknowledged in a number of recent interdisciplinary studies in finance and industrial organization. Such focal points could appear as a result of government regulation, as in the case of state-mandated ceilings on credit card interest rates (Knittel & Stango, 2003) ; due to industry standards, as in the case of requirements on stock price quotations in NASDAQ trades Christie, Harris & Schultz, 1994) ; or even due to social norms (e.g., Harvey, 2006) . This paper expands the list of such interdisciplinary studies by applying the theory of tacit collusion at the focal point to lowwage labor markets.
This paper also contributes to the minimum wage literature by expanding the list of possible effects of the minimum wage by pointing out its potential anticompetitive effect on the labor market structure and outcomes for low-wage workers. Empirically this is accomplished through the analysis of the well-documented minimum wage spike (Brown, 1999) , part of which, as we suggest, could be attributed to the employers' tacit collusion at the minimum wage.
While we view our explanation of the spike as rather plausible, we acknowledge that it is not necessarily exhaustive. However, the empirical approach we take is somewhat new: we evaluate the fraction of low-wage workers at the minimum whose wages should have been higher, and use this as an approximate measure of collusion. Most of the existing studies that disentangle the spike ask a different kind of question, namely, whether the spike represents workers whose wages were below the minimum prior to the hike.
Our empirical tests provide significant, though indirect, statistical evidence, which allows to claim that the tacit collusion of employers at the minimum wage is a valid hypothesis. The estimates of collusion we obtain reach levels as high as 40% for truncated regression estimations (80% lower confidence intervals applied) and 12.5% for hurdle model estimations.
1 I thank Prof. Bill Alpert for pointing this out.
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The paper is organized as follows. The first section surveys literature and empirical findings supporting the hypothesis that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a focal point for collusion. The second, theoretical, section of the paper brings together the theory of tacit collusion with the theory of focal points, relating them to the realities of low-wage markets. It formally states the research hypothesis. The third section of the paper explains the empirical strategy that was used in testing the hypothesis and presents the results of empirical estimations.
Minimum Wage: Literature and Stylized Facts
The minimum wage and its impact on labor markets has been extensively studied. Recent minimum wage research is largely empirical and usually analyzes its employment effects, as reflected in a review by Brown (1999) . The re-distributive role of the minimum wage is studied less frequently, as pointed out by Freeman (1996) : "Most of the analyses of the minimum wage focus on its unintended employment consequences. The goal of the minimum wage is not, of course, to reduce employment, but to redistribute earnings to low paid workers."
When the re-distributive impacts of the minimum wage are addressed, they are examined from the standpoint of whether the minimum wage increases earnings of low-wage workers (Meyer & Wise, 1983) , aids in combating poverty (Burkhauser et al., 1996) , reduces wage inequality (Dickens et al., 2004; Teulings, 2003; DiNardo et al., 1996) or possibly affects the entire wage distribution (Neumark et al., 2004; Lee, 1999; Dickens et al., 1998) .
Reconsidering the re-distributive efficacy of the minimum wage from a new angle poses the question of whether the minimum wage may reduce the wages of the low-paid (which could be realized if a minimum wage is nonbinding and used by low-wage employers to coordinate their wage-setting). Stylized facts and selected prior minimum wage research suggest that both coordination and non-bindedness of the minimum wage are possible, as evidenced by a large distributional spike at the minimum wage, wage compression, rising wage inequality and some other phenomena to be discussed.
Minimum Wage Spike
Perhaps the most important piece of evidence supporting the hypothesis of tacit collusion is the substantial clustering of wages around the statutory minimum -the so-called "minimum wage spike." (Brown 1999 (Brown , p.2143 summarizes:
"Among those who are employed, the distribution of ln(wage) tends to look bell-shaped with occasional spikes at round-dollar amounts. Often there is another spike, at the minimum wage, even when the minimum is not a round-dollar amount. Spikes at the minimum wage are stronger when the minimum wage is more binding; e.g. in wage distributions for teenagers rather than for all workers, and in years when the minimum wage has been raised rather than after several years of a constant nominal and eroding real minimum wage."
Wage information for a subset of retail and food industry employees in October 1996 (an arbitrary choice), when the federal minimum wage level was $4.75, shows that the minimum wage spike is, indeed, quite apparent ( Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: Minimum Wage Spike
Most common explanation to the minimum wage spike is "forced truncation" of the underlying wage distribution, suggesting that the minimum wage "takes a bite" from a wage distribution. As a result, some workers lose jobs (truncation), but some get a pay raise up to the minimum and above (censoring). This explanation, however, is challenged if one assumes that labor markets are competitive. If they are, profit maximizing employers would already be paying wages valued at their marginal products and would not be able to sustain a mandatory pay raise (see for ex., Kosters & Welch, 1972) . Thus, when the minimum wage is raised, all workers whose wages are below the new minimum should be displaced and we should observe truncation rather than censoring of the distribution.
The assumption of competitiveness should translate into high empirical estimates of elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage. However, these estimates are usually modest. Researchers report that a 10% hike in the minimum wage reduces teenage employment by about 1 to 6% and reduces employment of young adults by about 1% (Burkhauser et al., 1996) . Almost no study surveyed by Brown (1999) reported a significant impact of a higher minimum wage on adult employment or total employment. Panel data studies also show that the employment elasticity estimates are small. For instance, Currie and Fallick (1996) using NLSY data estimate that only about 3% of youth are less likely to be employed a year after a minimum wage increase. Thus, it raises a question whether there are any undercurrents in visibly competitive low-wage markets that would lead to such low elasticity estimates.
The theory of "offsets" is another common explanation to the existence of the minimum wage spike. It suggests that competitive firms facing higher minimum wages may adjust workers' non-wage compensation or increase workers' marginal work-load without laying off workers (e.g., Wessels et al., 1980; Meyer & Wise, 1983; Alpert, 1986) . This is a rather plausible explanation, which could contribute to the appearance of the spike. In fact, our results show that even after correcting for possible collusion, the spike does not entirely disappear (see Figure 4) , and the remaining spiking could be well attributed to the offsets. At the same time, the spike does not disappear completely even when minimum wage is eroded by inflation, suggesting that some parallel activity must also be contributing to its appearance.
Monopsony is another candidate for explaining the minimum wage spike. However, low-wage markets can hardly be viewed as structurally monopsonistic: the number of employers in this market is large. The recently developed theory of dynamic monopsony (Manning, 2003) , based on the equilibrium search model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , state that a monopsony-like equilibrium may arise even in visibly competitive markets due to the existence of search frictions. The theoretical model of dynamic monopsony, however, is unable to replicate the spike: "... the equilibrium wage distribution can have no mass points because it would then pay employers to deviate by paying an infinitesimally higher wage" (Manning, 2003, p.327) . Still, this theory does not contradict our proposition. Moreover, search frictions may further facilitate collusion by restricting already limited range of wages for searching unemployed workers.
The minimum wage spike was replicated in a dynamic search framework with Nash bargaining, by Flinn (2000 Flinn ( , 2003 Flinn ( , 2006 , Flinn and Mabli (2005) .
Their model assumes that markets are competitive and the minimum wage poses as a constraint in a Nash-bargaining problem. Thus, the nature of the spike is somewhat similar to the structural monopsony model, where minimum wage poses as a binding constraint. Also, minimum wage as a bargaining constraint should improve the pay of low-wage workers, contrary to our prediction that it should lower wages of those paid above the minimum. Additionally, the assumption of wage negotiation does not quite reflect the reality of wage markets.
Other Empirical Evidence
The review of the empirical literature on the employment effects of the minimum wage while providing insights into whether recent minimum wages were binding, it also hints how competitive the low-wage markets are. Both the degree of bindedness and competitiveness can be inferred from the values of employment elasticity with respect to the minimum wage estimated in numerous studies.
Several recent empirical studies report negative employment effects of the minimum wage, as predicted by neoclassical theory. For instance, Wascher (1996, 2000) , Burkhauser et al. (1996b Burkhauser et al. ( , 2000 report that a higher minimum wage reduces the employment of teenagers and youth, but find no effects for adults. Card and Krueger (1995) summarize a series of studies where they argued that recent (1990's) minimum wage increases did not necessarily reduce employment (or earnings), suggesting that employers have some control over wage setting, i.e. the affected markets are possibly monopsonistic. However, it has long been argued that low-wage markets are more competitive than monopsonistic, at least in a structural way.
Overall, the employment effects of the minimum wage are found to be rather small, as summarized in Brown (1999) , who rephrased a famous saying by Henry Kissinger: "...the debates over minimum wages were so spirited because the stakes were so low." Studies both before the 1980s and in the 1990s showed that minimum wages have almost no effect on employment of adults and only some effect on employment of teenagers and youth.
The absence of significant employment effects of the minimum wage for adults suggests that minimum wage levels were not binding for this subset of the labor force (and binding for some teenagers and young adults). In other words, employers were able to raise wages for the majority of adult workers, meaning that workers were paid below the value of their marginal contributions in the first place. Another interesting empirical phenomenon observed in the US labor markets during the past two decades is increasing wage inequality between the lowest and highest paid (e.g., Freeman, 1996; Lee, 1999) . Statistics show that real wages of the tenth and twentieth percentiles of workers were either falling or stayed the same since the 1970s in relation to the steadily increasing pay of high-paid workers (see Figure 2) .
A surging demand for high skilled labor and declining manufacturing employment are the major forces driving the rise in wage inequality. However, a non-binding minimum wage, by suggesting low-wage employers pay at a certain level, could also be contributing to an increasing gap in wages. Thus, inequality could have been rising not only due to increasing wages of the high-paid workers but also because wages of the low-paid are tied to the minimum.
The efficacy of the minimum wage in reducing inequality has been addressed in several recent studies: Neumark et al. (2004) , Machin et al. (2003) , Teulings (2003) and some others. These authors generally agree that minimum wages positively affect overall wage levels. However, they also note that, if the minimum wage is not raised frequently, its wage-lifting role may be diminished.
The tacit collusion hypothesis could also be supported with studies that emphasize the short-lived effects of minimum wage increases along with the phenomenon of wage compression. For instance , Neumark et. al. (2004) , when analyzing responses of wages, hours and employment to the chang-ing minimum wage, show that low-paid workers experience an initial wage gain, but combined with hours and employment, the total effect is negative. Machin et al. (2003) when evaluating the introduction of the national minimum wage in the UK in 1999 showed that, while it increased wages of low-paid workers (in the home-care industry), it also caused greater compression at the bottom of the wage distribution. Teulings (2003) suggested that the reduction in the real minimum wage in the 1980s (US data) increased wage dispersion at the bottom half of the distribution. He also estimated that a 10% reduction in the real minimum wage causes wages of someone earning the previous minimum to fall by 8%.
In summary, the evidence of a substantial minimum wage spike, the low estimates of the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage, stagnating earnings of the low-paid, and increasing wage inequality, along with some other empirical phenomena, support the hypothesis that there is room for employers' tacit collusion on a non-binding minimum wage.
The Theory of Tacit Collusion at a Non-Binding Minimum Wage
This section outlines a theory of collusion in labor markets by linking the standard Industrial Organization theory of tacit collusion with the Schelling's theory of focal points and applying it to the low-wage markets. A simple game-theoretic model -one of the possible variants of prisoner's dilemma, illustrates the arrival of low-wage employers to the tacitly collusive equilibrium.
Wage-Setting as a Coordination Game
Suggesting that low-wage employers tacitly collude when setting wages assumes that they play a coordination game. The assumption of wage-setting (not bargaining) is central for the coordination game to be possible. Wages that are observed in low-wage markets are often determined exclusively by employers, while employees have little influence. Since low-wage jobs are assumed to be homogenous, the pay is low and the replacement of workers is relatively easy, firms have no incentives to invest in search, selection or negotiation of pay for each individual worker. Therefore, setting wages at some fixed level and waiting for vacancies to fill could be the best maximizing strategy (and transaction-cost-minimizing) for low-wage employers.
The conditions of homogenous low-wage jobs and the absence of wagebargaining create an incentive for employers to coordinate wage-setting. If successful, such coordination may further reduce transaction costs and increase profits. Studies in industrial organization have many examples of such coordination in commodity markets: processed potato markets (Richards, Paterson, & Acharya, 2001) , retail gasoline markets (Borenstein & Shepard, 1996) , and timber sales (Baldwin, Marshall, & Richard, 1997) among others.
Perhaps most relevant to this paper is the study by Knittel and Stango (2003) , who analyze the likelihood of coordination in credit cards' ratesetting by US banks in the 1980s. During the investigated period, credit cards were similar enough to be assumed homogenous (APR being their main distinguishing characteristic); supply and demand sides of the market were represented by a large number of agents. These two conditions should had led to rather fierce competition among banks. However, the competition failed to emerge, as banks, soon after the adoption of the legislation which set state APR limits, learned that colluding on mandated rates is more profitable.
For the wage-setting to be identified as a coordination game, several other conditions should hold. These conditions include the symmetry of employers' preferences and beliefs, the number of potential equilibria is large, and the collusive equilibria are self-supported (Crawford & Haller, 1990) . The symmetry of preferences are self-explanatory: low-wage employers prefer low equilibrium wages over high. Also, low-wage employers are generally well aware of each others' strategies with regards to wage-setting. Next section discusses the remaining condtions: the multiplicity of potential equilibria and the sustainability of collusive equilibria.
The Minimum Wage as a Focal Point Equilibrium in a Two-Firm Wage-Setting Game A simple two-firm model is offered next to illustrate the idea that tacit collusion at a non-binding minimum wage is a possible outcome of a wagesetting game played by low-wage employers 2 .
Proposition: If the minimum wage is non-binding, wage-setting employers will be drawn to set wages at the minimum wage.
Consider a market consisting of two identical firms i and j that operate in a perfectly competitive product market with product price p. Labor is the only production input, with the input requirement of one unit of labor per unit of output. Workers are perfectly substitutable. The marginal revenue product of labor is assumed constant. The market labor supply is an upward sloping function of the wage S(w). In this environment, each firm sets the wage rate equal to the product price and will earn zero profits.
If firms compete in the labor market, a firm that pays a higher wage would attract the entire market labor force and would produce the entire market's output. Now suppose, that the two firms play a repeated wage-setting game in periods t = 0, 1, T . Let Π i (w it , w jt ) be a firm's i profit at time t, and the wage it pays to its employees w it . Symmetric notation is used for firm j. Each firm maximizes the present discounted value of profits (1).
Both firms discount their one period pay-offs by the discount rate β. At each date t firms set wages, utilizing the knowledge of histories of wage-setting, i.e. the firm has a perfect recall of past wages with history
where T is the current period.
In a finitely repeated game of wage-setting, this market is drawn to a Bertrand equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium the wage rate is equal to a perfectly competitive wage. Now, consider a wage-setting game in which the horizon is infinite (T = +∞). In this case, the Bertrand equilibrium is also a stable solution, but it is no longer the only possible equilibrium.
Denote w m a monopsony wage, which maximizes monopsony profit (2)
Suppose each firm follows a trigger strategy by setting the wage at the monopsony level w m if in every preceding period the competitor's wage was w m . By setting wages at this level, each firm earns half of the monopsony profits Π m /2. If a firm deviates and pays a higher wage w > w m in one of the periods, in this period it receives monopsony profit Π m and zero profit thereafter, since its rival sets the wage equal to the marginal revenue product of labor forever after the deviation from monopsony wage-setting, according to the trigger scenario.
Therefore, the trigger strategy will be an equilibrium if
which is equivalent to having β > 1/2 (where 2 is the number of firms in the market). In other words, sharing the market and receiving half of the monopsony profits indefinitely is more attractive to both firms than competing for workers by offering higher wages, as long as the discount rate β is sufficiently large. Notably, paying monopsony wage is a sustainable equilibrium even if no explicit coordination between the two firms is observed, thanks to the threat of zero profits. The above model is a version of the Folk theorem for repeated games with application to the labor market. The theorem ascertains that the game may have multiple equilibrium solutions. That is, the equilibrium wage can be set anywhere between the monopsony wage w m and the competitive wage w = p, as long as it is set symmetrically.
Successful wage coordination of cost-minimizing firms can be problematic, especially if the number of firms, as well as the number of possible equilibria, is large. However, the existence of a focal point can help to solve this coordination problem.
The minimum wage as a focal point. Coordination in the wage-setting game and committing to some symmetric wage within the interval w ⊂ [w m , p) is a difficult task for employers since the number of potential equilibria is large. As Tirole (1988, p.247) 
describes it:
"The supergame theory is, in a sense, too successful in explaining tacit collusion. The large set of equilibria is an embarrassment of the riches. Somehow the firms must coordinate on a "focal equilibrium" in order for the equilibrium to remain attractive. How is this equilibrium chosen? A selection process often used in the literature makes the assumption that in a symmetric game the focal equilibrium is symmetric and the assumption that the focal equilibrium must be Pareto optimal from the viewpoint of the two firms (i.e., must yield a payoff on the frontier of attainable set of per-period profits)."
The concept of a focal point equilibrium was first described by Thomas Schelling in his famous book "The Strategy of Conflict" (1960) . The more recent literature on focal points includes Binmore and Samuelson (2006) , Janssen (2001) , Colman (1997) , Crawford and Haller (1990) , and some others. In his book, Schelling suggests that for parties with common interests in coordination and without opportunities to do so explicitly, it is logical to choose a reference point, which would stand out from the multiplicity of possible equilibria and would be attractive and value-maximizing for the majority of players.
The choice of a focal point depends greatly on the circumstances and the environment in which players operate. In Schelling's terms, players are scanning the environment looking for a key that makes collusion possible (1960, p.57):
Finding the key, or rather finding a key -any key that is mutually recognized as the key -becomes the key -may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other.
The successful solution of coordination puzzles depends on the availability and the number of focal points, on the number of players, and on the number of repetitions the game is played. The larger the number of focal points and/or the larger the number of players, the longer it takes for them to coordinate on a unique solution. If the game is played repeatedly, as in the dynamic game described above, it takes less effort to coordinate with each successive repetition.
Schelling's concept of a focal point can be directly related to the discussion of the minimum wage. A task of coordination for wage-setting employers evolves into finding the focal wage, or the wage, in the range of possible equilibrium wages, which is acceptable and likely be chosen by other employers. A non-binding minimum wage can be used as such a focal point because of its apparent location, as it promises the highest possible payoffs to low-wage employers in the dynamic game of wage-setting.
Empirical Implications of Tacit Collusion
Theory and preliminary analysis of low-wage markets indicate that tacit collusion by employers is possible if they symmetrically decide to set wages at a non-binding minimum wage. This section outlines some empirical implications of such behavior, including the effects of factors facilitating collusion. The following section presents quantitative assessment of these implications.
Viewing the model presented in the previous section as a variant of the well-known prisoner's dilemma, let us separate low-wage employers into cooperators and defectors. Cooperators are the employers who choose to collude and secure their share of monopsony payoffs. Defectors, in turn, choose not to collude and receive monopsony profits in one of the periods and reduced (or zero) profits thereafter, since, if detected, defection triggers the competition and reduces all firms' long-run profits. This model, however, has a couple of drawbacks when contrasted against the reality of low-wage markets. First, the model has only two employers. Second, the model assumes perfect collusion in which deviation by one employer leads to the ultimate break-up of collusive agreement.
These drawbacks were previously addressed in the literature. Namely, Schelling (1973) , proposed a modified version of this model known as multiplayer prisoner's dilemma (MPD). It allows for the large (but finite) number of employers, as well as permits imperfect collusion, which is much more reflective of the reality of collusion. The assumption of imperfect collusion is rather important in this paper, since it allows us to flag wage observations as potentially collusive by comparing wages at the minimum (possibly collusive) to wages above the minimum (non-collusive).
The model allows collusion to be imperfect due to the property known as continuous externality, which assumes that one player's decision affects others' payoffs. The model advises as the number of colluding firms increases the payoffs of both colluding and defecting firms rise. It also advises that not all firms are needed to collude to make collusion sustainable, i.e. the market can be in equilibrium even if collusion is imperfect. Thus, the continuous externality MPD is more realistic when depicting real world collusion and its graphical model can be instrumental for analysis of the effects of facilitating factors on the likelihood of collusion.
A variant of the graphical model of an MPD with a continuous externality, originally due to Schelling (1973) is presented in Figure 3 . The figure depicts identical firms' instantaneous payoffs from colluding (C) and defecting (D) against the number of colluding firms on the market. The total number of firms is n. In the figure, ρ 0 is the minimum number of colluding firms that makes collusion possible and ρ is the actual number of colluding firms.
As collusion theory states, one of the important factors facilitating collusion is increasing input costs, which by reducing the benefits of defection increases the attractiveness of collusion. Let us see how rising input costs affect its likelihood. Denote r as the costs of inputs (other than labor) used in production. Then, an instantaneous payoff to a defector is Π m = (p − r − w)S(w), while the payoff to a cooperator is Π m n (assuming that deviation from the monopsony wage is infinitesimally small). A simple algebra shows that as r rises, the payoff to a defector falls by S(w), and the payoff to a colluder (when all collude) falls by S(w) n . Graphically, it changes the right hand side vertical intercepts for both curves D and C, with a larger vertical change for C.
Rising costs of other inputs makes the benefits from collusion rise faster than the benefits from defection (the slope of C is larger than the slope of , which affects both the "minimum efficient scale" of collusion and the overall collusion. The former rises from ρ 0 to ρ 0 , and the latter rises from ρ to ρ . This example illustrates how a change in input costs can affect the likelihood of collusion, the effects of other facilitating factors can be analyzed similarly.
Overall, the theory of factors facilitating collusion is a well developed chapter in industrial organization literature. Thus, we move on to formulating empirical implications of of tacit collusion at the minimum wage and its facilitating factors, which provide basis for statistical testing of the hypothesis. The list of facilitating factors includes(similar to Knittel & Stango, 2003) :
• Changes in the real minimum wage. When the minimum wage is raised it is binding for a larger fraction of employers. Thus, the share of collusive wages should be smaller. Symmetrically, when minimum wage erodes it becomes less binding and the likelihood of collusion should be larger.
• Changes in the minimum wage. A change in the minimum wage level is a shift of the focal point that requires a period of learning before the collusion is restored. As an employer observes reactions of other employers to the shift in the focal point, it simultaneously has to make decisions with regards to own wage-setting in the temporary "infor-mational vacuum". Thus, following hikes in the minimum wage level, the likelihood of collusion should decline. Conversely, as the minimum wage erodes, the learning of the focal point improves. Therefore, the longer the period of time since the change in the minimum wage, the greater collusion should be observed.
• Anticipated changes in the minimum wage. An announcement of a future increase in the minimum wage should have similar effects as the increase in costs of other inputs. The anticipated increase in the costs, which a higher minimum wage de facto is, forces employers to re-optimize and take advantage of the previous lower focal point. Thus, the probability of collusion should increase if the change in the minimum wage is anticipated.
• Number of firms on the market and firms' density. Tacit collusion is easier to maintain when the number of employers on the market is small ceteris paribus, since coordination is trivially easier. However, the firm density and geographical proximity in the given market should be taken into account as well. Greater density may also improve coordination, increasing the likelihood of collusion. Thus, the combined effect of the number of firms and the firms' density can be ambiguous.
• Firm size may have either a positive or a negative impact on the likelihood of collusion. The sign of the impact will depend on the relative magnitude of the two effects: the "payoff" effect and the "time" effect. The sign of the payoff effect is positive since larger firms may be more inclined to defect since their one-period payoffs from "cheating" are larger. The sign of the time effect is negative as larger firms are more likely to cooperate since their "lives" are generally longer than those of smaller firms. Therefore their discounted multiperiod payoff maybe reduced if they ever trigger a wage war. Also, larger firms' wage policies are more visible and their cheating is discovered sooner than those of smaller firms. Alternatively, larger firms' may play a role of wage leaders and an idiosyncratic wage increase resulting in the wage hike for the entire industry will work against their maximization goals.
• Favorable (product and labor) demand conditions. Collusion is more difficult to sustain in periods of high demand due to increased incentives to deviate (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986) .
In addition to the effects of the facilitating factors, tacit collusion at a non-binding minimum wage has the following general empirical implications:
• If a focal point facilitates collusion, greater clustering of observations at the focal point (minimum wage) should be observed.
• Firms operating in visibly competitive but tacitly collusive markets should demonstrate high and persistent profits not accompanied by product quality and/or cost advantages. As a consequence, the industry should demonstrate higher than average frequency of new entries (e.g., Porter, 2005) , and in the case of labor markets a larger than average rate of job creation.
Empirical Strategy
The survey of empirical literature and the theory of collusion at a focal point provide enough background to hypothesize that the minimum wage may facilitate tacit collusion if the focal point is non-binding. We use a number of empirical techniques in order to test this hypothesis. One technique used to evaluate the extent of collusion in the empirical industrial organization is the estimation of hurdle models, originally due to Cragg (1971) . I build upon the Knittel and Stango (2003) adaptation of Cragg's model to testing for collusion in credit card markets.
The estimation of a hurdle model of collusion at a focal point requires the empirical distribution of dependent variable to be censored in the markets affected by focal point, and not censored in other markets, a desired control group. This would allow to identify observations at the censoring point as collusive by comparing them against own (censored) distribution and control (uncensored) distribution.
It is practically impossible to find US low-wage labor markets that would satisfy these requirements. First, a control group of markets unaffected by the minimum wage is nearly non-existent. Second, as preliminary examination of data shows, the exact left censoring of empirical wage distributions at the minimum wage is non-existent due to non-compliance or exemption for certain subgroups of workers. Instead, we observe extensive clustering of wages not only at the minimum wage, but also below and above it.
This reality of the empirical data has lead to a modification of the original empirical approach. Namely, we start with running a series of truncated regressions in order to "reconstitute" wage distributions to be used in estimations of hurdle models. Doing so also allows to obtain some preliminary estimates of the extent of collusion. Truncation also provides a base for testing the theory of facilitating factors through the estimations of probit models. Results of the probit regressions are very similar in interpretation to the second hurdle in estimations of double hurdle models. Thus, the modified approach empirical techniques present, to an extent, some variation of the hurdle model. Thus, we begin with the specification of this model.
Basic P-Tobit Model
The hurdle model (also known as p-Tobit) evaluates the likelihood of collusion at a non-binding minimum wage by the means of maximum likelihood. It is built upon Tobit with an extra estimated probability parameter that denotes the fraction of wage observations at the censoring point that should have been observed above censoring. This probability parameter can also be approximated by estimating truncated regression, with a subsequent prediction of wages for observations immediately below the truncation point and calculating the share of wages, predicted values of which should be higher than observed (i.e., potentially collusive).
Therefore, specifying the hurdle model first will also cover the case for truncated regression since the underlying logic of estimating collusive shares is similar. In addition, both models utilize the same specification of the wage equation.
We start with the reduced form wage equation (the 'latent wage') in the absence of collusion and minimum wage, which is:
where:
X it -is a set of worker characteristics; µ s -is a set of state fixed effects; η t -is a set of time-period fixed effects; and e it -is an error term, N (0, σ 2 ).
The binding minimum wage censors the wage distribution according to the following schedule:
where M st -is a minimum wage in state s. No wages are observed if the latent wage is below the existing minimum.
Thus, allowing for censoring, the likelihood function is a simple Tobit model:
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The probability of observing wage that is equal to the minimum wage is given by:
Introducing an indicator of collusion:
c it = 1 if an employer colludes; 0 otherwise.
With collusion, the observed wage schedule becomes:
And the likelihood function becomes:
In equation (6), ρ measures the conditional probability of collusion when minimum wage is non-binding (the probability parameter). It represents a fraction of wage observations, in which the latent wage is higher than the existing minimum, but the observed wage is equal to the minimum.
The evaluation of the likelihood of collusion would benefit from the inclusion in the estimation of a comparison group with observations from markets not covered (and not affected) by minimum wage legislation. However, it is close to impossible to obtain such a group of observations within a US labor market. Thus, we circumvent the problem by splitting the sample into two groups and then censoring only one of them when estimating p-Tobit. Doing so may bias the estimation results downwards, since the empirical wage distribution is likely located to the left of the latent wage distribution, if it is affected by collusive behavior of employers.
Introducing an indicator of coverage:
1 if a worker employed in covered sector; 0 otherwise.
The observed wage schedule with division of observations by coverage then becomes:
Incorporating the latter into the likelihood function gives:
In Equation 7, ρ stands for the conditional probability of tacit collusion when the minimum wage is non-binding in the covered sector. It is assumed that the uncovered sector is unaffected by collusion. The list of variables included in the vector X of worker characteristics is given in the Appendix 2.
Alternative Estimation Technique: Truncation
The estimation of a hurdle model would generally calls for an inclusion of a control group of markets that have not been affected by the factor of interest, in our case a group of markets with no minimum wage requirements. As have been mentioned earlier, it is largely impossible to find such a control group of markets in the US since most industries are required to comply with the minimum wage laws.
Another problem with detecting collusion stems from the potential contamination of wages that are adjacent to the minimum by collusive wagesetting. The analysis of wage histograms shows that the spiking occurs not 20 only at the minimum wage but within a larger interval surrounding it (see Figures 1, 4) . This spiking could potentially corrupt the accuracy of estimates obtained in p-Tobit regressions. That is, the procedure employed in the maximum likelihood estimation repeatedly compares wage observations at the minimum to all observations above the minimum, some of which could be affected as well. As a result, p-Tobit estimates of the ρ are likely to be biased downwards.
To work around these two problems we employe a technique, further referred as "chain truncation," which is supposed to reduce contamination and re-create a control group. Regressions estimated by chain truncation are based on the original wage equations that were specified for the hurdle model above.
For each of the analyzed months, the wage distribution was initially truncated at the year's top wage for the first quartile of the distribution. The values of wages at the point of initial truncation ranged from $8.50 in 1990 to $12.50 in 2005. This choice of a cut-off point for the initial truncation is justified by the fact that the remaining observations still represent a large enough sample to identify the parameters of a wage equation. At the same time, the range of wages up to the cut-off point generally includes most of the spiking. After the cut-off points were established, truncated regressions using the set of wages to the right of the cut-off point were estimated. The obtained parameters of the wage equation were then used to impute wages of workers that are currently paid 50 cents below the cut-off point. Three levels of confidence using the standard forecasted error (since imputation was done to the wages beyond the original sample) were applied: a lower 80%, 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Then, if the appropriate confidence bounds for the imputed wages of workers were higher than actually observed, the imputed values were substituted for actual within this 50-cent interval.
Next, the truncated regression was estimated using the data that included the following 50-cent-below range, with imputation applied to the next lower 50-cent interval. Such "chain truncation" was repeated on average 14 times, until wages below the minimum wage were reached. Figure 4 illustrates the extent to which the original distributions were modified through the consecutive truncations when 80% confidence intervals were applied. Chain truncation was instrumental in establishing the upper estimates of potential collusion, the results of which are reported in Section 5.
Is it Collusion?: Probit Model
Chain truncation results, by providing an estimate of the extent of collusion, also serves as a basis for testing the theory of facilitating factors. This approach is somewhat similar to an estimation of the so-called second hurdle in the "double-hurdle" model (Cragg, 1971) , in which the contribution of various factors to the probability parameter ρ is explained by the set of applicable regressors.
The following probit model was estimated:
c it is a an indicator of collusion; Z it is a set of facilitating factors; λ s is a set of state fixed effects; κ t is a set of time-period fixed effects; and ν it is an error term, N (0, σ 2 ).
In the set of Z's, the following variables are included:
• a set of variables indicating time periods since/until a change in minimum wage legislation. These variables indicate the effects of the "changes in minimum wage" factors discussed in the section on empirical implications. It is reasonable to expect that the relationship between the time elapsed since/until the latest minimum wage change and probability of collusion is likely non-linear. Thus, we create a set of binary variables by grouping observations according to the time period relative to the next minimum wage change: a month since/until the change, 1 to 6 months since/until the change, 7 to 12 months since/until the change, and more than 12 months since/until the change.
• a variable "wages of college graduates" is chosen as a proxy for "costs of other inputs," another facilitating factor. The variable was constructed using the information available in the CPS. We divided the respondents into age groups unique for each state and month. Respondents aged from 15 to 65 years old were split into 10 five-year age intervals. Then, I calculated the wages of college graduates within each group. The wages of hourly as well as non-hourly workers with college degrees were used. We expect a positive coefficient on this variable, since higher input costs should increase the attractiveness of collusion.
• state monthly unemployment rates were included as a proxy for demand conditions with a purpose of testing another empirical implication: in periods of high demand collusion is less likely. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on this variable, since higher unemployment indicating poor demand conditions induces greater collusion.
• and finally, two proxies for the number of firms in the labor market were entered: a "central city" dummy and a "metro area, not central city" dummy. These variables were chosen to capture the number of firms and firms' density factors. As was previously discussed, the sign of this coefficient will depend on the joint impact of these factors. If density factor prevails in the urban low-wage markets, we expect a positive coefficient. Othewise, the coefficient is expceted to be negative.
ization, as well as some background variables: age, sex, race, ethnicity, geographic location, etc. Sixteen years of CPS were used in the estimations, 1990 through 2005, a period that covers the last four federal minimum wage increases and indicates extensive variation in states' own minimum wage levels. State' and the federal minimum wage data is given in Appendix 1.
Hourly paid employees' data was used for two reasons: First, measurement error should be minimized due to the calculations of hourly wages. Second, the category of workers of most interest to this study is hourly employees since the "frame" of the minimum wage is more relevant for firms employing hourly workers.
Minor data cleaning was performed. Workers' records satisfying the following conditions jointly were excluded: reported as a member of the full-time labor force; no work hours reported; weekly earnings less than $100; hourly wages lower than $1. All workers older than 75 years old were excluded from the work sets.
Some additional variables crucial to the analysis of facilitating factors were added to the data set. These variables include minimum wage data (US Department of Labor data on minimum wages combined with annual surveys of states' labor legislation published in Monthly Labor Review annually). Monthly state unemployment rates published by US DOL were also used in this analysis.
Estimation and Results

Preliminary Examination of Potential Collusion: Results of Chain Truncation
Consecutive estimations of truncated regressions is the first empirical exercise, which provides indirect evidence of collusion, as it prepares data for p-Tobit estimations. Obtained estimates indicate that collusive behavior exists in low-wage markets, it is persistent, and exhibits certain cyclicality visibly related to shifts in minimum wage legislation.
Truncated regression models were estimated on average 14 times for each of the 192 months of data (16 years). When assessing the extent of potential collusion, the lower 80, 90 and 95% confidence intervals using the standard error of the forecast were applied when calculating predicted wages 3 . All models were heteroscedasticity-corrected, as testing suggested 3 The computation of confidence intervals was done using the standard error of the 24 that this problem is present in the data.
The estimates of potential collusion based on the chain truncation results are presented in Appendix 3, which includes two sets of tables: one for the states with minimum wages at the federal level and another for the states with minimum wages above federal. The percentages reported in the tables reflect the shares of wage observations within specified intervals, which lower (80/90/95% CI) estimates of predicted wages are higher than actual. The intervals of interest are: the interval ranging from minimum wage up to the 50 cents above minimum wage, and the interval ranging from minimum wage up to the 25th percentile of the distribution. Selected results of chain truncations are summarized in Figure 5 .
If tacit collusion is present, wage observations which are closest to the minimum wage would be most affected. As can be seen from the graph, our estimates of potential collusion for wages at 50 cents above and at the minimum, are very sensitive to changes in the minimum wage, and more so for the subset of states with the federal minimum. Following the federal minimum wage increases of 1990-91, the share of potentially collusive wages within this interval was declining for about two years for these states. It reached a local peak in the first half of 1996, immediately before another federal minimum wage hike. After the subsequent increase in 1997 collusion declined for about three years, then steadily climbed until 2005.
Note that the estimates of potential collusion are generally higher for the subset of states that follows federal minimum wage requirements than for the states with their own minimum wage laws. For the former the average monthly percentage of potentially collusive wages is estimated at 19.9%, while for the latter it is only at 16.6%. In 2004 and 2005, the years furthest from the last hike in the federal minimum, the estimates of potential collusion are the largest for the states that follow the federal minimum: on average 30% of workers earning within 50 cents off the minimum wage should forecast since predicted wages (50-cents below the initial truncation point) were not in the estimation sample. Standard error of prediction is used to estimate confidence intervals for predicted values within the sample. To illustrate the difference between these two, let's look at the results of regression for January 1995, truncated at $9. The average logwage for the observations within $8.50-8.99 is equal 2.172, with the average predicted (or forecasted, if you will) log-wage is 2.396. The average standard error of the prediction for this interval of wages is 0.071, and the average standard error of the forecast is 0.433, six times larger. This gives an average lower 80% CI bound for imputed log-wages equal to 1.841 when the forecast error is used, which is still significantly smaller than 2.213, a lower 99% CI bound obtained when using the standard error of the prediction. Using the more stringent criteria for the imputations allows to flag wages of workers only significantly smaller than their predictions as potentially collusive with a certain degree of confidence.
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Figure 5: Selected Results on Chain Truncation 26 have had higher wages, and at times this estimate exceeds the 40% mark.
As potential collusion in the states with higher than the federal minimum wage is generally smaller, the pattern of collusion indictors is also less persistent. While after 1999 the estimates of collusion do not exceed 25%, and expansions alternate with contractions, the remaining states exhibit a continuous climb up until 2005.
For the entire lower quartile of hourly wage observations (above minimum wage) the cyclical pattern of collusion is present, though less pronounced. The strongest reaction of the collusion indicator to the minimum wage increases in states with the federal minimum is in 1996, with a subsequent temporary decline and a small, but steady ascent thereafter (lower graph, Figure 5 ). Perhaps, "contamination" by collusion lessens the further a wage observation is from the minimum, which contributes to the overall smoothing of the collusion indicator.
The estimates of potential collusion within the lowest quartile of wages in states with the federal minimum also exceed similar estimates for the states with their own minimums: 21.5% versus 20.1%.
The results of the chain truncations indicate that more frequent changes in the minimum wage tends to reduce the extent of collusion by moving wages of the low-paid up in the wage distribution. And the longer the period of time that had elapsed since the change, the estimates of collusion tend to get larger. As a result, the growth in wages of workers at the lower end of the distribution is slowed down when the minimum wage does not change, which is consistent with the collusion hypothesis: if employers use the mandated minimum wage as a reference point for tacit collusion one should expect lower wages and slower wage growth.
As a check for robustness, we calculate shares of potentially collusive wages by using only the lower half of hourly wages, i.e. truncating the distribution both on the left and on the right 4 . The results are reported in Appendix 4. As you can see from the table, results are similar to the original truncations that used all hourly wage information. Moreover, the latter estimates of collusion are on average larger than the original, with the average estimate of collusion for the 50-cent-MW interval of 4.9% versus 6.6% (for states with the federal minimum), a difference of 1.7%. For the entire lower quartile of hourly wages in states with the federal minimum, the difference between the two estimations is slightly larger, about 1.9%. For the subset of states with higher than the federal minimum wages, the difference in the estimates retain the same sign, though the magnitude of the difference is somewhat smaller, equal to 0.8% for both 50-cent-MW and the entire lower quartile of hourly wages.
Overall, estimates of collusion obtained through chain truncation support the collusion hypothesis. The results indicate that the wages of workers located close to the minimum are consistently underpaid when compared to workers with similar characteristics up along the wage distribution. Collusion is found to rise when the minimum wage is not changing, and temporarily falls, when the minimum wage is increased.
One might argue that the regressions did not account for some unobservable characteristics common to minimum wage workers that might be driving the results. This possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. However, the fact that the identical estimation procedure was consistently applied to all sets of data allows us to assume that the relative impact from omitting possible unobservables is the same. Moreover, the estimates of collusion that are somewhat continuous and rule-like responding to changes in the minimum wage suggest that wage-setting in low-wage markets has a strategic component.
P-Tobit Estimates of Potential Collusion
The estimation of truncated regressions provides a good indication of the extent of tacit collusion for the lower quartile of hourly-paid workers. This section extends the analysis by reporting results of p-Tobit regressions, which utilize wage information at/below truncation points that was not used before.
P-Tobit models are essentially Tobit models with an extra estimated probability parameter that, in our case, measures the proportion of wages that should have been higher (would be able to cross the hurdle) if the collusion at a focal point were absent. P-Tobit models are also similar to truncation with a subsequent manual calculation of collusive shares. Still, there are some differences. The p-Tobit regression requires that observations are censored. Three such censoring points were chosen for this paper: the minimum wage (with all eligible observations below being brought up to the minimum), the wage fifty cents above the minimum wage, and the wage one dollar above the minimum wage.
There is also a difference in the interpretation of the collusion estimates. While the results of chain truncations calculate the average share of potential collusion by continuous slicing of the entire lower quartile of hourly wages by small increments, the p-Tobit regressions evaluate the overall likelihood of whether wages at or below the point of censoring should had been above the censoring point. Therefore, the further an actual wage observation is to the left from the point of censoring, the less likely it will be flagged as collusive. Additionally, when estimating the likelihood of collusion by p-Tobit we pool monthly data into annual sets (factoring out state and month fixed effects). As a result, the obtained probability parameter measures an annual average estimate of potential collusion. Therefore, a direct comparison of the estimates obtained through chain truncations and p-Tobit regressions would not be appropriate. However, the overall pattern of the results should be preserved.
P-Tobit regressions were estimated using annual data for each of the three censoring points, for the full sample of hourly employees, as well as for the subset that includes states with the federal minimum wage. Wage observations below the mandated minimum for adult workers (21 years and older) employed in the food industry were deleted, since their wages most likely do not reflect the value to tips earned; they represented on average 0.4% of the sample. All estimates have robust standard errors. The results are reported in Appendix 5, selected results are displayed in Figure 6 .
The highest estimates of ρ were obtained using samples censored at the minimum wage. Among observations at/below the point of censoring on average 5.1% (5.6%) for the subset of states with the federal minimum were identified as potentially collusive (estimates are generally 100% significant).
The discrepancy between the estimates of potential collusion for the entire set of data and the subset of states with the minimum wage at the federal level is rather consistent, which supports the prediction that more permanent focal points result in greater collusion (Figure 6, 1) . The average estimate of ρ for the model censored at "MW+50c" is 4.2% and 4.3%, and for the model censored at "MW+$1" it is 4.8% and 4.9%, for the two subsets respectively.
Note also, that the gap between the estimates obtained for the two subsets of data is increasing towards the minimum, perhaps implying that the suggestive power of the focal point is stronger the closer the observation is to the focal point.
Furthermore, estimates of ρ for the sets censored at "MW+$1" are generally higher than for the sets censored at "MW+50c". This suggests that a substantial fraction of wages above "MW+50c" but below/equal "MW+$1" is collusive (Figure 6, 2) . It makes sense if we recall that the federal minimum wage was set at the lower halves of the dollar, $4.25 in 1991-1996 and $5.15 in 1997-2005 , during most of the considered period. Individual histograms show that indeed, the spiking occurs at the next to minimum (Brown, 1999) . This raises a question whether low-wage employers view the wage equal to the next-to-minimum round dollar as another focal point for collusion.
The p-Tobit estimates of collusion display somewhat similar cyclical patterns as do the results of truncated regressions. Collusion estimates drop temporarily following the change in the minimum wage levels, and it is generally larger for the states with the minimum wage set at the federal level. As can be seen from the graphs, in 1991 and 1997 when the federal minimum wage went up, estimates of collusion fell sharply. As the minimum wage eroded, a steady climb in the estimates of collusion is observed. Following the recession of 2001, collusion jumps for the full sample, driven by the states with higher than the federal minimum wage. The subset of states with lower minimum wages reacted to the changing demand conditions a year later. As can be seen from the graphs, the estimated collusion for these states in 2002-2005 exceeds the same estimates for the states with a higher minimum wage: they react more slowly, but the effects of reduced demand carry on longer.
These results reiterate several empirical implications of tacit collusion discussed in the second section. First, when the minimum wage is raised, a shifted focal point makes employers re-discover each others wage-setting strategies and results in a decrease in collusion, which is reflected in brief declines of the estimates of ρ following minimum wage hikes of 1996-97. Second, a stable minimum wage creates a fertile environment for collusion, reflected in sharp increases in the estimates towards the end of the analyzed term. Overall, the results the of p-Tobit models provide modest but statistically significant evidence in support of the collusion hypothesis.
Probit Model: Test of Facilitating Factors
The next step in the empirical investigation of the collusion hypothesis is determining whether wage observations that were flagged as potentially collusive indeed follow the theory of facilitating factors. This is done with the help of probit models, with a dependent variable that indicates whether a wage observation is collusive and the set of regressors proxies the facilitating factors.
The dependent variable is based on the results of chain truncations with application of the 80% lower CI and standard error of the forecast. Cross sections of monthly data for all 16 years were pooled into a single data set. Probit regressions were estimated using the four subsets of data: for the entire lowest quartile of wages, for wages equal to the minimum, for wages ranging from the minimum to the 50 cents above the minimum, and for wages ranging from the minimum to a dollar above the minimum. Such a division allows us to get an additional insight on how the marginal contribution to collusion changes as we move further away from the minimum. The results of probit regressions are reported in the table of Appendix 6. Selected results are also presented in Figure 7 .
Before we proceed to a discussion of individual slope coefficients, it is instructive to note the model's increasing explanatory power the closer wage observations are to the minimum wage. As can be seen from the table, the pseudo R 2 is the greatest for the subset that include workers earning exactly the minimum, and is decreasing as the set expands. This is indicative that the model designed to explain the effects of collusion induced by the nonbinding minimum wage indeed captures these effects.
The signs of the slope coefficients are also generally consistent with predictions for factors facilitating collusion. The first set of dummy variables indicate the responsiveness of the collusion indicator to the timing of a minimum wage change. For the variable "month of minimum wage change", its contribution to the likelihood of collusion is practically zero. This result is in accordance with the prediction stating that a shift in the focal point temporarily breaks down collusion. However, the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant for the entire lower quarter of hourly wages, suggesting that wages of workers on the upper end of the quartile are lowered on average by 2% during the month of a minimum wage change. This result possibly reflects the theory of "offsets", which predicts that employers facing a higher wage floor may be raising wages of the lowest-paid workers at the expense of higher-paid.
Another set of variables capturing the effects of a shifting focal point is the "months-since" dummies (2 to 6 months, 7 to 12 months, and 13 and more). The coefficients on these variables are, as expected, negative for the first two specifications. For observations at the minimum, the likelihood of collusion is lowered by 7.4% (6.3% for the second specification) if it has been 2 to 6 months since the minimum wage hike. For the expanded sets of data the values of the coefficients are 3.1-3.2% 5 . For the variable signifying 7 to 12 months since the change in the minimum wage, the coefficients are also negative, but smaller, reflecting perhaps an improved coordination. For observations at the minimum, variable's contribution to collusion is .3% (4.2%) and 2.9% and 2.2% for the expanded sets. Note that the coefficients on "months-since" variables become insignificant when the real minimum wage variable is introduced into regressions, suggesting that these variables are related, though not linearly.
Another group of time-related variables is the "months-until" dummies. Its role is to capture the effect of an anticipated raise in the focal point, which implications on collusion are similar to effects of increasing input costs. The coefficients on these variables are positive, as expected, and increase when the change in the minimum wage is approaching. The magnitude of the coefficients also rises the closer the observations are to the minimum wage ( Figure 8, panel 2) . These coefficients are generally significant.
Wages of college graduates were used as a proxy for costs of other production. As anticipated, the obtained coefficients are positive, supporting the empirical implication that higher costs of other inputs leads to greater wage collusion in low-wage markets. The coefficients are significant for all model specifications and remain relatively stable when specifications change. Again, the observations closer to the minimum wage are more likely to be flagged as collusive when costs of other inputs increase. The average effect on the likelihood of collusion for minimum wage earners is estimated at 0.89% for every dollar increase in the wages of workers with college degrees. As we expand the set, this effect gets smaller: 0.74% and 0.67% for the "MW+50c" and "MW+$1" intervals, averaging to about 0.44% for the entire lower quartile of hourly employees.
State and month specific unemployment rates were chosen to proxy for demand conditions. The obtained coefficients are generally inline with the theoretical predictions. Considering the fourth specification of the model, coefficients are positive and significant, denoting contribution to the collusive outcome of a 1% increase in unemployment: 0.76% for the set of minimum wage observations, 1.01% for "MW+50c" observations, 1.07% for "MW+$1" observations and 0.53% for the entire lower quartile of hourly wages (above the minimum). The seemingly puzzling lower coefficient for the model that uses minimum wage observations only can be explained rather simply: a higher unemployment rate can no longer reduce the wages of workers to below the minimum level (which is impossible).
A couple of binary variables chosen as proxies for the number of firms and firms' density are "central city" and "metropolitan/not central city" variables. These were expected to have negative coefficients if metropolitan employers were to compete for low-wage workers, and positive if the spatial proximity of employers, on the opposite, promoted collusion. The estimated coefficients for both variables are positive and significant, suggesting that the spacial component is more relevant in the wage-setting of metropolitan employers when compared with rural employers (Figure 7, panel 4) .
The coefficient for the metropolitan area dummy is, however, greater than for the central city dummy for workers earning exactly the minimum, suggesting that suburban employers are more likely to collude on the minimum wage. Thus, the combined effect of the proximity factor and the number-of-employers factor for the metropolitan employers resulted in a higher marginal propensity to collude, pointing out their more a successful coordination on minimum wage. For the expanded sets of data, the coefficients are higher for the central city variable, suggesting that the overall effects of collusion on low-paid workers are larger in cities than in the surrounding metropolitan areas.
Real minimum wage variable introduced in specifications 3 and 4 of the probit model was meant to test the prediction whether a more binding minimum wage reduces the likelihood of collusion. The obtained estimates support this prediction. For workers earning exactly the minimum, a dollar increase in the real minimum wage reduces the likelihood of collusion by about 24% (specification 4; see Figure 8 , panel 7). This effect, however, dissipates gradually the further the wage observation is from the minimum.
The last variable of the probit equation is the dummy denoting that a worker is located in a state with the federal minimum. In such states changes in the minimum are unfrequent and employers have ample time to learn the focal point and each other's wage-setting strategies. As expected, the coefficients are positive and significant for the models using the subsets of observations immediately adjacent to the minimum (Figure 8, panel 6 ). The coefficient is larger for the set of "MW+50c" observations, implying perhaps that collusion "moves" up in the distribution in the states that have not had a raise in the minimum wage for a long time. The result is insignificant for the entire lower quartile of hourly wages, once again pointing out the importance of the focal point in facilitating collusion.
In summary, the results of the probit models provide strong statistical and theoretically meaningful evidence in support of the collusion hypothesis.
Conclusion
This paper is a first attempt to explain some interesting empirical puzzles found in low-wage labor markets. Perhaps, the most visible among them is the minimum wage spike puzzle. By combining industrial organization theories of tacit collusion and focal points with labor market analysis, this paper broadens the range of possible explanations of the minimum wage spike.
Our explanation of the puzzle is that in the infinite game of wage-setting low-wage employers are likely to collude if suggested a symmatric wage rate, salient and accepted by many as joint profit-maximizing. If a large enough number of employers choose to set wages at the legally mandated but nonbinding minimum, it may lead to a stable, though socially inefficient, collusive equilibrium.
We test this hypothesis empirically by analyzing implications of tacit collusion in the form of lowered wages, their clustering, and their responsiveness to factors facilitating collusion. We find that the tacit collusion very likely affects the labor market outcomes of low-wage workers. The results of both truncated and p-Tobit regressions show that collusion rises when minimum wage is not changing, and when it does, collusion temporarily decreases. The estimates of the slope coefficients in the probit regressions also indicate that close to the minimum wage observations are influenced by collusive behavior of employers. Additionally, the strategic response of employers to changes in the minimum wage is clearly observed when separately analyzing wage responses in states following the federal minimum wage mandate, which exhibit greater overall collusion.
As our results inidcate, a higher minimum wage tends to decrease collusion. However, it should not be assumed that by simply raising the minimum wage this problem would be eliminated. For a policy-maker, raising the minimum wage poses two questions. First, at what value it should be set, which calls for the finding a just-binding value. The choice of such a value is, if you will, the "stick with two ends" 6 : a uniform minimum wage will likely be more binding for some industries, resulting in layoffs, and less binding for others, resulting in tacit collusion! From this perspective, either industryspecific minimum wages or employer-union negotiated wage levels seem as of lesser evil.
The second question that a policy-maker addresses is how often the minimum wage should be raised. If collusion at non-binding minimum wage is real, it calls for more frequent changes in its levels. However, if these changes are anticipated, the extent of collusion widens. Moreover, if the coming hikes in the minimum wage (and their magnitudes) is known in advance, it is equivalent to having a stable focal point, and the effect of the new higher minimum in combatting collusion will be minimal.
As tacit collusion by wage-setting employers at the non-binding minimum wage as a very likely state that the low-wage markets are in, the reader should be cautioned that the evidence we present in the paper is indirect (though tacit collusion is hard to prove in general). There are at least two ways that would allow us to improve upon the results and get more immediate evidence of collusion in the future. First, obtaining a joint employer-employee dataset that would include variables on firms' size, sales, costs, profits and hiring/firing activity would allow to unveil a more direct link between firm's performance and collusion. No publicly available datasets in the US (and to our knowledge no administrative sets either) have such combination of variables. Second, having a control group of markets that are not affected by the minimum wage regulations would also allow the better identification of the proposed relationship between the minimum wage and collusion. As was previously discussed, such control groups are rather difficult to locate when using the US data. A possible solution lies in investigating possibilities of using foreign data.
Overall, our research suggests the role that a non-binding minimum wage plays as a possible focal point for tacit collusion by employers should be taken into account by policy-makers who design labor market policies aimed at improving earnings of the low paid. The redistributive efficacy of the minimum wage is jeopardized if it becomes the reference point for collusion, and should be further analyzed. 
